Shifts in Social Development and Fertility Decline in Iran: A Cluster Analysis of Provinces, 1986-1996 by Erfani, Amir
PSC Discussion Papers Series
Volume 19 | Issue 12 Article 1
9-2005
Shifts in Social Development and Fertility Decline
in Iran: A Cluster Analysis of Provinces, 1986-1996
Amir Erfani
University of Western Ontario, aerfani@uwo.ca
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/pscpapers
Recommended Citation
Erfani, Amir (2005) "Shifts in Social Development and Fertility Decline in Iran: A Cluster Analysis of Provinces, 1986-1996," PSC
Discussion Papers Series: Vol. 19 : Iss. 12 , Article 1.
Available at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/pscpapers/vol19/iss12/1
ISSN 1183-7284
Shifts in social development and fertility decline in Iran: 
A cluster analysis of provinces, 1986-1996
by
Amir Erfani
Discussion Paper no. 05-12
aerfani@uwo.ca
September 2005
On the web in PDF format: http://www.ssc.uwo.ca/sociology/popstudies/dp/dp05-12.pdf
Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of Canadian Population Society (CPS),
Dalhousie University, Halifax, July 2003, in a session titled “Internal migration,
Urbanization, and Development” 
Population Studies Centre
University of Western Ontario
London CANADA N6A 5C2
Discussion Paper
title page verso
 
 
1
Shifts in social development and fertility decline in Iran:  
A cluster analysis of provinces, 1986-1996 
 
 
Abstract 
Iran is experiencing the third phase of demographic transition (low levels of birth and 
death), following a sharp fertility decline experienced during 1986-1996 period and is 
still underway. Using the analytic framework of Davis and Black, we examined the 
impact of social development and contraceptive prevalence, respectively as the structural 
and proximate determinants, on rapid fertility decline in Iran. We found that the social 
development level of provinces had a great impact on fertility decline through 
contraceptive prevalence indirectly. The cluster analysis of social development indices in 
1986 and 1996 revealed that 15 out of 24 provinces of Iran moved from a lower 
developed status in 1986 to a moderate or a higher developed status in 1996 (twelve 
provinces moved from a “less developed” state in 1986 to a “moderate developed” state 
in 1996, and three provinces moved from a “moderate developed” state in 1986 to a 
“developed” state in 1996). In addition, regarding to the social development levels and 
fertility rates, the gap between provinces decreased during 1986-1996. That is, a shift 
from heterogeneous to more homogeneous patterns of social development and fertility 
occurred across Iran’s provinces during 1986-1996.        
 
Introduction 
Iran has already experienced a remarkable decline in fertility. The sharp decline in 
fertility occurred during the 10- year period of 1986-1996: total fertility rate per married 
women declined from 6.2 in 1986 to 3.3 in 1996 and to 2.5 in 2001(SCI, 2000b; SCI 
2001). This demographic miracle made Iran’s population enter to the third stage of 
fertility transition with a low fertility and mortality levels.  
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Five distinctive stages are recognized in Iran’s fertility transition; they imply different 
trends of fertility change (see Table 1 and Figure 1). In the period before 1946, the crude 
birth rate was relatively constant around 40 per thousand populations, but in the second 
stage, during 1946-66, crude birth rate increased steadily from 40.7 to 48.6 per thousand 
populations. Thus, the absolute number of population mounted from 14.2 to 26.0 million 
during this period (SCI, 2000a). That is, 83.1 percent of population was added to Iran’s 
population during this 20-year period.  
 
A modest fertility transition can be seen during 1966-76 when the crude birth rate 
decreased from 48.6 live births per thousand in 1966 to 40.1 per thousand in 1976.This 
decrease implies an average annual population growth rate of 2.7 percent, compared to 
the average annual growth rate of 3.2 percent in the preceding decade (1956-60). The 
absolute number of population increased from 26.0 to 33.7 million during this stage (SCI, 
2000a). In contrast fertility increased from 40.1 live births per thousand populations in 
1976 to 50.2 per thousand in 1986. As a result, the absolute number of population rose 
from 33.7 million in 1976 to 49.4 million in 1986 (SCI, 2000a). It means that 46.6 
percent of population was added to the Iranian population during this 10-year period, 
something more than half of the increase in the first stage within a 20-year period.  
The sharpest fertility decline occurred in the last stage, starting from1986 and still in 
progress. During this period, crude birth rate fell from 50.2 in 1986 to 26.5 per thousand 
populations in 1996. Therefore, the absolute number of population changed from 49.4 
million in 1986 to 60.1 million in 1996 (SCI, 2000a). In other words, 21.6 percent of 
population was added to the overall population of the country in 1996. 
--Table 1 and Figure 1 about here -- 
The declining trend of fertility has been continuing after 1996. It is estimated that the 
crude birth rate has already decreased from 26.5 live births per thousand populations in 
1996 to 18.3 in 2001(SCI, 2001). Furthermore, it has been suggested that four provinces, 
  
 
3
namely Esfehan, Gilan, Semnan, and Tehran, have already experienced below 
replacement level fertility (Abbasi, 2001).    
 
Such rapidity in fertility decline makes Iran an interesting case among developing 
countries for examining determinates of rapid fertility decline. This study intends first to 
examine changes occurred in the social development of provinces during 1986-1996 and 
then to examine the relationship between social development levels of provinces and 
fertility decline in Iran. In the following, first theoretical perspectives and past researches 
are argued, and after that the conceptual model and hypotheses are developed. In the 
section of results, first the impacts of structural and proximate determinants of rapid 
fertility decline across provinces will be investigated, using regression and path analyses. 
Then, a cluster analysis of social development indices will examine shifts in the social 
development patterns provinces during 1986-1996, and at the end the findings will be 
discussed.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
Davis and Blake (1956) defined a set of direct fertility determinants know as 
"intermediate variables" through which structural variables influence fertility behavior. 
Their model can be simply illustrated as follows:  
 
Several studies have used this model to examine the impacts of structural and proximate 
determinants of fertility level at national level as well as variations in fertility across sub-
populations and socio-economic groups. Mauldin (1988), for instance, explored that 
socio-economic settings explain 23 percent of fertility decrease indirectly through family 
planning program (intermediate factor), while family planning program can directly 
Socio-Economic 
Variables 
Intermediate 
Determinants 
Fertility 
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explain 44 percent of fertility decrease by itself. Developing Davis and Blake's model, 
Bongaarts (1978) found that variations in marriage, contraceptive and induced abortion 
are the most important sources of fertility differentials in the United States and Korea. 
Martin (1996), who applied the model of Davis and Blake, also found that variation in 
age at marriage, as the other intermediate variables, played a strong role in decreasing 
fertility. 
 
Regarding the influence of structural factors on fertility behavior, some studies have 
shown that unequal development can accelerate socio-economic inequality among the 
subpopulations in a society and hence increase variation in fertility. Gonzales-Cortes 
(1981), for instance, pointed out the result of a study on the development strategies and 
population policies, implemented by CELADE. According to one part of this study, in 
those parts of Latin America where a socialism-oriented development program had been 
implemented, the structural heterogeneity was very small; therefore, fertility decline 
across all subpopulations (provinces, cities, etc.) was homogeneous. In contrast, in those 
countries which experienced a capitalism-oriented development program, the structural 
heterogeneity was very deep; thus, considerable differences in fertility are seen across 
subpopulations.  
Amirahmadi and Atash (1996) showed that Iran’s provinces during 1956-1984 have 
developed unequally. They concluded that Iran’s provinces can be categorized in three 
groups in terms of their development levels: relatively developed, middle and less 
developed provinces. As a result, they suggested that this pattern of development has 
been sustained with a little change, even after the Islamic Revolution occurred in 1978. 
Their analysis on provinces is limited to the decade just after the Revolution (1978-86) 
and did not go beyond this categorization and did not examine demographic changes that 
might be related to such an unequal development pattern. In effect, as Mirzaie (1998) 
described, the “swings” in fertility change should be examined in the context of socio-
economic and policy changes occurred during the last three decades in Iran.  
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The development strategies implemented before the 1978 Islamic Revolution was mainly 
oriented to a Western-capitalist model. Although in this period (1966-1976) there was a 
significant fertility decline, but Iran’s provinces developed unequally. A few provinces, 
such as Tehran, the capital city, as the core provinces developed and modernized, but the 
rest of provinces which held mainly a rural structure, remained less developed and 
deprived. Such pattern of development persisted across provinces even during the decade 
after the Revolution when the eight- year war between Iran and Iraq took place and most 
of resources were allocated to war, instead of to developing the provinces. 
 
After ending the war in 1988, the new Constructive government implemented the first 
and the second new five-year social, economic and cultural development plans 
respectively in 1989-1994 and 1994-1999. These plans included two important aims: 1) 
targeting social development of rural and remote areas and 2) implementing an extended-
joint national family planning and health program so as to control rapid population 
growth and to improve the health standards across provinces. In fact, the core ideas 
behind these programs were to diminish the wide gaps between rural-urban, core-
peripheral, and developed-underdeveloped areas across the country.  
 
We, therefore, hypothesize that Iran’s provinces approached an equal pattern of social 
development in 1996, compared to the unequal pattern of development in 1986. That is, 
the standards of living in the rural and remote areas improved, and the gap between 
provinces in terms of social development indicators decreased. This pattern of 
development as well as some other macro factors, such as the economic hardship 
followed the imposed war and the support of religious leaders for legalizing contraceptive 
use, were precursors for making people’s attitude “ready” to acceptance the freely 
“available” family planning services. Therefore, the significant enhancement in the 
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standards of life indirectly, through the high prevalence of contraceptives, affected 
fertility across provinces. Using Davis and Blake’s model (1956), the above mentioned 
hypothesis will be examined. In addition to indirect effect of structural variables on 
fertility, one direct path also is added to the conceptual model so as to compare the 
contributions of direct and indirect effects of social development of provinces on rapid 
fertility decline. The conceptual model is depicted in Figure 2.                                             
 
Figure 2. Conceptual framework for analyzing fertility decline in Iran 
 
 
Methodology  
The province-specific data regarding different social indicators, fertility and 
contraceptive prevalence rates, which are based on the results of 1986 and 1996 census 
and some KAP surveys, were taken from measures estimated by Statistical Center of Iran 
(SCI) and other published researches (Zanjani 1991; SCI 2000c; Mehryar 2001; SCI 1988). 
Based on these data, the dependent, intermediate and independent variables in our model 
will be measured.  
 
Fertility as the only dependent variable was measured by crude birth rate (CBR), and the 
percentage of using contraceptives among married women aged 15-49 is the intermediate 
Intermediate 
Variables 
Fertility 
Social 
Developme
t
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variable through which the impact of social development on fertility operates. As 
improvement of the standards of life through the whole provinces, especially the rural 
and deprived areas, have been the major concerns of the two five-year national social, 
economic, and cultural development plans, implemented respectively in 1989-1994 and 
1994-1999, social development levels of provinces were chosen as  independent variable 
in the model. Various definitions of “social development” have been already proposed1, 
so there is no agreement on the definition as the measures of the concept range from 
quantitative indictors, such as provision of the basic needs and services, to qualitative 
processes, such as democratization. However, the core elements in most of the definitions 
are “improvement of life standards” and “empowerment of poor people” through 
interventions of governments and agencies by establishing and executing equitable 
initiatives. Relying on these core ingredients, we use four indicators, namely life 
expectancy at birth (E0), infant mortality rate (IMR), literacy rate of women aged 15 and 
over (EDU), and urbanization (URB) to construct the index of social development levels 
of provinces. Each of the indicators has a range wherein the minimum and maximum 
values indicate the lowest and highest level of development respectively, except the 
indicator of infant mortality rate which functions inversely (see Table 2). Harmonizing it 
with the other indicators, we subtracted 100 from the value of infant mortality rate for 
each province. The new indicator is composed of the minimum and maximum points 
indicated the lowest and highest level of development. The results of factor analysis of 
the four indicators revealed that the four indicators of social development index 
contribute to the index (latent factor) unevenly, with different weights2. The weights of 
indicators used here are basically the factor scores plus number one; where the indices of 
social development for each province in both years (say, 1986 and 1996) are computed as 
follows:  
 
                                                          
1 For instance, look at the list of definitions presented in a report of World Bank posted in 2002 on 
www.worldbank.org/oed/sdstudy/design_paper.pdf 
2 The explained variance of social development index for 1986 and 1996 are respectively 69.2 and 74.5 
percent.  The KMO values for 1986 and 1996 indices are respectively .65 and .80.   
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Social Dev. (1986) = (1.305E0 + 1.276URB+ 1.346EDU +1.270IMR)/4 
Social Dev. (1996) = (1.293E0 + 1.264URB+ 1.301EDU +1.300IMR)/4 
 
The results are shown in the last two columns of Table 2. The values of the index can 
range between 0 and 100, where 100 denote a very highly developed province and 0 
signifies a very highly underdeveloped one. Kurdestan province with index value of 28.0 
in 1986, for instance, was the least developed province in Iran, while Tehran with values 
of 93.3 was the highly developed province at that time. It is clearly seen that the index 
values pertaining to all provinces significantly improved in 1996.    
-- Table 2 about here -- 
The investigation of the conceptual model requires some relevant path coefficients which 
are obtained from some regression structural equations. It should be noted that the 
conceptual model will be examined only for 1996 as there was no available data 
regarding contraception for 1986. To demonstrate changes occurred in the social 
development patterns and status of provinces in one decade from 1986 to 1996, we apply 
cluster analysis method on the scores of indices of social development.  
 
Results 
Based on the analytical model presented in figure 3, it is considered that the direct effect 
of social development levels (DEV) of provinces on the crude birth rate (CBR) is -.27. 
The negative sign indicates that the more socially developed, the lower is fertility of 
provinces. 
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Fig.3.The analytical model for fertility decline among 26 provinces, Iran 1996 
 
Referring to the research hypothesis and Davis and Black assumption, the socio- 
economic environment has more indirect impact on fertility decline. Thus, the indirect 
effect of social development (DEV) on fertility is -0.38 (= -0.50 * 0.76). The indirect 
impact of social development levels of provinces on fertility decline is obviously more 
than the direct impact of that.  
 
The total direct and indirect effects of social development level of provinces on fertility 
decline is equal to -0.65 (= -.27 + (-.38)). That is, the model could explain a high percent 
of the overall relationship between social development of 26 provinces and their fertility 
levels in 1996. In fact, population of a province with a lower crude birth rate are usually 
more literate, lives more in urban areas, and has a higher life expectancy and lower infant 
mortality and vise versa (see Table 2). In the following, we further elaborate shifts from 
unequal to more equal social development of provinces occurred during 1986-1996, and 
to introduce clusters of provinces, in terms of their social development levels, that would 
be useful for future researches.  
CONT 
DEV 
CBR 0.76 
-0.50
-0.27
e1 = 0.64 
e2 = 0.69
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Shifts in social development status of provinces  
Social development patterns of provinces in 1986 and 1996 have been illustrated in 
figures 4 and 5, clustering the scores of social development indices by SECLID measure 
(Squared Euclidean Distances) as one of the method of cluster analysis. This measure 
computes the distance between two cases (provinces) by the square root of the sum of the 
squared differences in values on each variable. That is, Distance (x, y) = √∑ ((Xi -Yi) 
**2) (Bartholomew and et al, 2002: 28). 
 
The cluster analysis of the scores of social development index pertaining to provinces in 
1986 (see Figure 4) distinguished three clusters, where provinces with the relative 
identical development levels fell into one single cluster. As Figure 4 shows, provinces 
numbered 14, 15, 5, 20, 11,16, 28, 3, 25, 18, 12, 21, 2, and 10 are the members of a large 
cluster which has the lowest average score of development index (say, 50.4), compared 
with other two clusters; therefore, we label this cluster as “less developed” provinces. 
Similarly, provinces numbered 4, 17, 22, 6, 13, 27, 24, and 8 fell in one other single 
cluster, with an average index scores equals to 67.9 which is 25.8 percent more than that 
of  less developed provinces; thus, we call this cluster as “moderate developed” 
provinces. The last province, i.e., Tehran, is the only province fall into the third cluster, 
with a relatively high score (93.3), so we label it as “developed” province. We can 
clearly see in Figure 4 that the distance between the less and moderate developed clusters 
are shorter than that between the less developed and developed clusters; this is why they 
have joined in one main branch. In contrast, the distance between the developed cluster 
and two other ones is substantially large because it has located in a separate main branch. 
Furthermore, the province numbered 19 has the lowest development score, i.e., 28.0, and 
has fallen into a single branch cluster. These two single-member clusters, namely 
Kurdestan and Tehran, are respectively the most deprived and modern provinces in 1986. 
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This fact implies of existing a highly heterogeneous patterns of social development 
among provinces. 
-- Figure 4 about here -- 
Following implementation of the government’s development plans and national family 
planning and health programs after 1986, the social development status of provinces 
changed drastically (see Figure 5). If Figure 5 is compared with Figure 4, it will be 
considered that social development status of some provinces has significantly changed. 
Cluster analysis of the scores of social development index for 1996 also revealed three 
distinctive clusters of provinces.  The first cluster consists of six provinces numbered 
13,23,27,26, and 24, which are the most developed provinces in Iran, with a very high 
average score of 96.2, so we label it “developed” cluster of provinces. In addition, 
eighteen provinces numbered 5,10, 28,12,20,15,22,,4,14,16,1,3,11,2,17,6,8, and 21are 
fallen into another cluster of provinces, with an average score of 80.3; thus, we name this 
cluster as “moderate developed” cluster of provinces. The last cluster, which is composed 
of three provinces numbered 18, 19, and 25, has the lowest average score of social 
development index (67.2), compared to other two clusters. Hence, it is named as “less 
developed” cluster. The difference between the average scores of “less developed” and 
“developed” clusters of provinces in 1986 and 1996 are respectively 42.9 and 29.0. In 
addition, the difference between the “moderate developed” and “developed” clusters of 
provinces in 1986 and 1996 are respectively 25.4 and 15.9. This means that the gap 
between provinces in terms of levels of social development has decreased between 1986 
and 1996, and hence provinces moved from heterogeneous to more homogeneous 
patterns of social development. Comparison of the means and standard deviations 
pertaining to the indicators of the indices depicted in Table 2 obviously show such 
considerable shifts in social development of provinces.  
-- Figure 5 about here -- 
In general, the number of provinces with “moderate developed” status has increased in 
1996, compared with that in 1986. To examine this change more precisely, we have 
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developed a turnover table, based on the results of two dendrograms depicted in Figures 4 
and 5 (see Tables 3). The results of Table 3 show a large off-diagonal changes in the 
development status of twelve provinces which have moved from “less developed” status 
in 1986 to “moderate developed” status in 1996. In addition, the development status of 
three other provinces, namely Esfehan, Yazd, and Semnan, has changed from “moderate 
developed” in 1986 to “developed” status in 1996. Therefore, social development status 
of 15 out of 24 provinces improved from 1986 to 1996, and the status of the rest of 
provinces have not changed during this period.   
-- Table 3 about here -- 
Similarly, fertility levels of provinces have changed from a heterogeneous to 
homogenous patters between 1986 and 1996 (see Figure 6). The results of Figure 6 show 
a linear association between social development levels of provinces and their fertility 
rates. It is clearly seen that 1996 scatter plots are more convergent both horizontally and 
vertically than 1986 ones. This indicates that fertility have declined in all provinces along 
with improvements in social development levels of provinces.  
 -- Figure 6 about here -- 
Other evidences further support our hypothesis. As mentioned beforehand, 
implementations of various styles of development strategies and government national 
policies before and after the Islamic Revolution in Iran led to different demographic 
outputs. Before the 1978 Islamic Revolution, Shah implemented a western-style 
development policy. As a result, heterogeneity was intensified among subpopulations. 
Then, after revolution, the new government made special attention to the deprived areas 
(i.e., rural and remote areas). The new government’s policy was based on the Islamic 
thought as to all members of a society have equal rights to hold a good quality of life. 
Therefore, “soon the Constructive Jihad Organization was established to revive and 
develop the economic and social conditions of the villages and deprived regions. The 
activities of the organization ranged from providing educational and health services to 
constructing roads and dams, and to distribution of agricultural machinery and 
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equipment. This contributed to the establishment of a sound and healthy rural 
environment after the revolution, and made rural areas of Iran significantly different from 
those of other countries in the region” (Abbasi, 2002: 428).  
 
In spite of the eight–year war with Iraq which started in 1979 and consequently led to an 
economic hardship, the new government’s policy could slightly diminish heterogeneity in 
social development levels of subpopulations. From 1976 to 1996 the quality of life in 
urban and especially rural areas simultaneously improved. For example, the proportion of 
rural households having clean water rose from 21.5 percent in 1976 to 71.1 percent in 
1996. Similarly, the proportion of households in rural areas having electricity increased 
from 14.2 percent in 1976 to 88.5 in 1996. The same upward trends can be seen for 
access to telephone, and literacy rate (see Tables 4 and 5). For instance, the literacy rate 
of population aged 6 and over in rural areas which was 30.5 percent in 1976, mounted to 
69.3 percent in 1996, and the gap between rural and urban areas in terms of literacy rate 
reduced from 35.0 and 25.1 percent respectively in 1976 and 1986 to 16.4 percent in 
1996. Therefore, the wide gap between urban and rural areas regarding household access 
to clean water, electricity and telephone, and literacy rate considerably diminished from 
1986 to 1996 in the face of an approximately constant growing rate of urban population 
(SCI, 1999: 15).  
-- Tables 4 and 5 about here -- 
As to the reduction in fertility differentials, provinces have shifted to a more convergence 
pattern. For instance, the differences between the crude birth rates of Sistan, with the 
highest fertility level, and Gilan, with the lowest fertility, decreased from 22.5 in 1986 to 
19.97 in 1996; such reduction is also reflected in the standard deviations of their crude 
birth rates ranging form 5.6 in 1986 to 4.7 in 1996 (see Table 2). Thus, Iran’s provinces 
have been approaching more convergence fertility patterns. 
 
  
 
14
The government policies as well as the economic hardship after the war, therefore, 
generated some rapid structural changes in society. These rapid changes imposed 
immediate forces on the cost of living, especially costs of childrearing and increased the 
expectations of families to put more emphasis on the quality rather than quantity. In 
effect, this condition has been a powerful precursor for the great achievement of the 1989 
national-joint family planning and health program in reducing infant mortality and total 
fertility rates across the country. This is why Iran’s family planning program is called a 
“Responding to a Nation’s Needs” (Roudi–Fahimi, 2002); the needs which were 
generated by the rapid socio-economic changes.      
 
Summary and Discussion 
The main objective of this paper was to explore the relationship between change in the 
social development status of provinces during 1986-1996 and rapid fertility decline. The 
results of a cluster analysis conducted on the scores of social development index showed 
that twelve provinces moved from “less developed” status in 1986 to a “moderate 
developed” position in 1996. In addition, three provinces shifted from a “moderate 
developed” status to a ‘developed’ status, and the gap between the three social 
development states (less developed, moderate developed, and developed) decreased from 
1986 to 1996. Therefore, we conclude that Iran’s provinces have already shifted form a 
heterogeneous to more homogeneous patterns of social development. Our further findings 
suggest that the same shifts simultaneously occurred in fertility levels of provinces. That 
is, shifts to homogeneous patters of social development have been accompanied with 
changes from divergent to convergent patters of fertility across provinces.  
 
To further explore this link, we analyzed the impact of social development levels of 
provinces on fertility decline directly as well as indirectly through contraceptive 
prevalence rate in 1996, using analytic framework of Davis and Black and existing data. 
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Consistent with our conceptual model, we found that the indirect impact of social 
development levels of provinces through contraceptive prevalence rate is much greater 
than the direct impact of that. This is probably an indication for salience role of social 
development in reducing fertility, compared with the role of contraceptive. The analysis 
of the results of 1986 census support our conclusion as they show that  fertility started to 
decline in the whole country before implementation of the 1989 national family planning 
and health program (Mirzaie et al, 1996). Caldwell (1997) also suggests that socio-
economic changes in every fertility transition is a precursor that brings fertility in 
people’s economic calculus; then, the cultural and ideological debates on the status and 
roles of women within family and society, pros and cons of large family size, and 
contraceptive use taken place at the macro level among intellectuals, religious leaders, 
and politicians would make people’s attitudes ready to practice fertility control. This is 
what happened in Iran after ending the eight-year war between Iraq and Iran. 
 
First, the paradoxical situation resulted from social development of rural and remote 
areas along with the economic hardship followed the war made people’s fertility 
decisions come to their economic calculus due to both their growing expectations and the 
poverty resulted from economic hardship; the former is similar to this notion that 
“development is the best contraceptive”, and the later follows an idea similar to 
“Malthusian de pauvrete”.  Then, after revealing the results of 1986 census which showed 
a high population growth rate for Iran, the scientific, cultural and ideological debates on 
population control, legalization of contraceptive use and sterilization were taken place 
among professionals, clergies, and politicians. These debates ultimately led to the 
establishment of 1989 family planning and health program which was a punctual 
“responding to a nation’s needs”.     
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Table 1 – The crude birth and death rates, and the average natural 
growth rate of population; Iran 1876-2001 
 
Years 
 
Crude Death Rate
( 1000) 
Crude Birth Rate 
( 1000) 
Average Annual Natural 
Growth Rate 
( 1000) 
1876-1881 36.1 40.1 ~ 4 
1881-1886 36.0 40.0 ~ 4 
1886-1891 36.0 40.0 ~ 4 
1891-1896 36.1 40.1 ~ 4 
1896-1901 36.0 40.0 ~ 4 
1901-1906 35.7 40.0 4.27 
1906-1911 34.2 39.9 5.74 
1911-1916 33.0 39.7 6.66 
1916-1921 32.9 39.6 6.66 
1921-1926 32.8 40.5 7.72 
1926-1931 31.7 40.6 8.95 
1931-1936 28.2 40.2 12.03 
1936-1941 25.5 39.4 13.95 
1941-1946 24.5 40.7 16.18 
1946-1951 26.8 45.6 18.76 
1951-1956 23.7 48.9 25.22 
1956-1966 17.0 48.6 31.6 
1966-1976 13.0 40.1 27.1 
1976-1986 14.2 50.2 36.0 
1986-1991 9.9 34.4 24.5 
1991-1996 6.5 26.5 14.7 
1996-2001 6.3 18.3 12.0 
       Sources: Figures before 1996 were taken from Amani (1995); figures during 1996-2001  
                      were taken from SCI (2000c and 2001). 
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Table 2. Selected social development indicators; Iran’s provinces, 1986 and 1996 
Crude Birth 
Rate (1000) 
 
Life 
Expectancy at 
Birth (Year) 
 
Infant 
mortality Rate 
(1000) 
 
Urbanization   
% 
 
 
Female 
Literacy Rate 
% 
 
Scores of Social 
Development 
Index 
 
 
 
Province 
1986 
(1) 
1996 
(2) 
1986    
(3) 
1996 
(4) 
1986 
(5) 
1996 
(6) 
1986 
(7) 
1996 
(8) 
1986 
(9) 
1996 
(10) 
1986 
(11) 
1996 
(12) 
Ardebil 
Azarbayejan E. 
Azarbayejan W. 
 Bushehr 
Charmahal 
Fars 
Gilan 
Hamedan 
Hormozgan 
Ilam 
Esfehan 
Kerman 
Kermanshah 
Khurasan 
Khuzestan 
Kuhguiluyeh 
Kurdestan 
Lorestan 
Markazi 
Mazandarn 
Ghom 
Semnan 
Sistan & Bal. 
Tehran 
Yazd 
Zanjan 
NA. 
40.9 
41.6 
47.5 
49.8 
43.4 
33.5 
43.4 
49.7 
50.4 
39.4 
45.4 
42.7 
44.4 
47.0 
53.4 
47.6 
46.7 
38.2 
39.0 
NA. 
36.8 
56.0 
34.5 
42.5 
43.6 
23.99 
18.30 
24.27 
23.36 
25.19 
20.69 
16.33 
22.73 
29.93 
25.68 
17.31 
2413 
22.87 
23.62 
27.23 
29.68 
26.38 
25.19 
19.98 
16.33 
22.19 
18.02 
36.30 
15.55 
29.06 
23.99 
NA. 
56.20 
57.90 
56.50 
56.40 
64.30 
63.10 
56.40 
56.30 
55.50 
60.20 
62.20 
56.50 
54.90 
64.90 
55.90 
53.10 
59.10 
65.30 
62.70 
NA 
62.90 
51.00 
68.30 
59.00 
59.60 
60.79 
66.52 
64.58 
66.25 
65.96 
67.53 
69.28 
65.56 
65.43 
63.76 
69.06 
65.45 
64.83 
64.33 
66.88 
62.77 
61.58 
64.57 
66.74 
66.71 
67.65 
67.68 
61.11 
69.30 
78.54 
65.18 
NA. 
96.7 
103.6 
58.0 
67.2 
56.2 
51.1 
91.1 
63.9 
78.7 
71.3 
75.9 
74.8 
115.2 
71.3 
83.2 
130.7 
76.4 
105.8 
63.1 
NA 
63.10 
83.70 
46.30 
68.50 
105.9 
45.8 
42.8 
48.1 
43.9 
44.9 
38.5 
31.4 
46.6 
45.1 
54.1 
32.3 
47.1 
49.4 
51.6 
41.1 
58.0 
63.6 
50.6 
41.7 
42.0 
37.8 
37.5 
65.4 
31.4 
37.2 
42.8 
NA. 
49 
46 
50 
36 
51 
38 
37 
40 
41 
64 
43 
56 
48 
55 
27 
40 
47 
44 
39 
NA 
59 
41 
87 
67 
43 
54 
64.8 
57.3 
54.2 
52.7 
59.5 
53.1 
53.9 
41.5 
57.9 
80.5 
59.5 
63.6 
61.5 
63.7 
48.1 
56.8 
56.1 
63.5 
49.5 
92.1 
73.8 
48.3 
85.5 
80.9 
51.3 
31.4 
41.7 
34.3 
50.6 
44.3 
56.3 
58.0 
43.6 
41.8 
40.0 
62.7 
51.5 
42.8 
46.9 
48.6 
39.9 
23.2 
41.2 
51.2 
54.4 
57.5 
63.2 
25.3 
78.4 
61.60 
39.6 
64.9 
68.2 
58.7 
75.2 
70.4 
77.4 
74.6 
71.3 
66.6 
71.2 
80.9 
74.8 
70.1 
76.8 
70.0 
68.3 
57.4 
68.9 
73.9 
74.6 
77.0 
80.8 
48.8 
85.0 
79.8 
67.8 
NA. 
48.9 
43.9 
64.7 
55.3 
70.1 
67.7 
47.8 
56.8 
51.4 
70.3 
59.0 
58.8 
44.3 
64.3 
45.6 
28.0 
55.6 
50.7 
62.8 
NA 
72.2 
43.3 
93.3 
71.2 
44.6 
75.4 
82.7 
74.9 
81.2 
78.8 
85.8 
85.7 
78.8 
73.8 
77.0 
96.1 
81.5 
80.3 
80.9 
83.7 
71.4 
68.4 
77.1 
84.6 
80.3 
96.2 
91.8 
62.1 
99.4 
97.3 
77.9 
Mean 
SD 
44.0 
5.6 
23.3 
4.7 
59.0 
4.3 
66.1 
3.3 
79.2 
21.3 
45.0 
8.7 
47.8 
12.4 
60.4 
12.4 
47.3 
12.4 
71.3 
7.9 
57.1 
13.6 
81.6 
9.0 
Sources: Figures in columns 1, 3; 2, 4, 8; 5, 6, 9, 10; and 7 extracted respectively from Zanjani (1991: 130 
and 176); SCI (2000c); Mehryar (2001); and SCI (1988). Figures in column 11 and 12, and means 
and standard deviations (SD) were computed by author. 
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Table 3. Illustration of shifts in social development status of provinces in Iran from   
1986 to 1996 by frequency and name of provinces 
Clusters of provinces by Social development status (1996) 
 
Developed Moderate Developed 
Less 
Developed 
Total 
Developed 
 
Tehran 
 
(1) 
  1 
Moderate 
Developed 
Esfehan, 
Yazd, Semnan
(3) 
Bushehr, Khuzestan, Mazandarn, 
Fars, Gilan 
(5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
C
lusters of provinces by Social developm
ent status (1986) 
 
Less 
Developed 
 
 
 
 
Kerman, Kermanshah, 
Charmahal, Lorestan, Khurasan, 
Zanjan, Ilam, Markazi, 
Azarbayejan E, Hamedan, 
Azarbayejan W, Hormozgan 
(12) 
Kuhguiluyeh,
 Kurdestan, 
 Sistan  
(3) 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
 
Total  4 17 3 24 
  Source: Figures 4 and 5. 
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Table 4. Percentage of households by access to certain utilities in urban and rural 
areas; Iran 1976-1996 
                  1976                     1986                    1996   
Utilities 
 
Total Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total Rural Urban 
Clean water 52.0 21.5 89.3 74.2 52.1 90.5 87.2 71.1 96.3 
Electricity 48.3 14.2 90.2 84.2 66.1 98.1 95.3 88.5 99.1 
Telephone 6.7 0.2 13.6 11.1 0.6 18.5 33.1 10.0 46.0 
Source: SCI (1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Literacy rate of population aged 6 and over by urban and rural areas; Iran, 
1956-1996 
Year Total Country Urban Areas Rural Areas Difference of Urban and Rural Rates 
1956 15.1 34.6 6.1 28.5 
1966 29.4 50.4 15.1 35.3 
1976 47.5 65.5 30.5 35.0 
1986 61.8 73.1 48.0 25.1 
1996 79.5 85.7 69.3 16.4 
        Source: SCI (1999); figures in the last column were computed by author. 
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Figure 1. Demographic Transition in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran during 1876- 2001 
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* * * * * H I E R A R C H I C A L  C L U S T E R   A N A L Y S I S * * * * * *
 Dendrogram using Average Linkage (Between Groups)
                                     Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine
       Provinc          0         5        10        15        20      25
(Social Development Score) Num   +---------+---------+---------+---------+-------+
  Kerman (59.0)          14   òø
  Kermanshah (58.8)      15   òôòø
  Charmahal (55.3)        5   òú ó
  Lorestan (55.6)        20   òú ó
  Hormozgan (56.8)       11   ò÷ ó
  Khorasan (44.3)        16   òø ùòòòòòòòø
  Zanjan(44.6)           28   òú ó       ó
  Azarbayjan W (43.9)     3   òú ó       ó
  Sistan&Balo.(43.3)     25   òú ó       ó
  Kohgilooyeh (45.6)     18   òôò÷       ó
  Ilam (51.41)           12   òú         ó
  Markazi (50.7)         21   òú         ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòø
  Azarbayjan E (48.9)     2   òú         ó                ó
  Hamadan (47.8)         10   ò÷         ó                ó
  Booshehr (64.9)         4   òø         ó                ó
  Khozestan (64.3)       17   òú         ó                ó
  Mazandaran (62.8)      22   òú         ó                ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòø
  Fars (70.1)             6   òôòòòòòòòòò÷                ó                   ó
  Isfahan (70.3)         13   òú                          ó                   ó
  Yazd (71.2)            27   òú                          ó                   ó
  Semnan (72.2)          24   òú                          ó                   ó
  Gilan (67.7)            8   ò÷                          ó                   ó
  Kordestan (28.0)       19   òòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷                   ó
  Tehran (93.3)          26   òòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷
Figure 4. Dendrogram for between-groups linkage hierarchical cluster analysis of scores of social 
development Index among provinces; Iran, 1986
 
Legend for Provinces:
Bold:       Developed 
Underlined: Moderate Developed 
Italic:     Less Developed 
Source: Table 2
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* * *  * * H I E R A R C H I C A L  C L U S T E R   A N A L Y S I S ** * * * *
 Dendrogram using Average Linkage (Between Groups)
                                     Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine
    Provinc          0         5        10        15        20      25
 (Social Development Score) Num  +--------+---------+---------+---------+-------+
  Charmahal (78.8)        5   òø
  Hamadan (78.8)         10   òú
  Zanjan (77.9)          28   òú
  Ilam (77.0)            12   òú
  Lorestan (77.1)        20   òôòø
  Kermanshah (80.3)      15   òú ó
  Mazandaran (80.3)      22   òú ó
  Booshehr (81.2)         4   òú ùòòòø
  Kerman (81.5)          14   òú ó   ó
  Khorasan (80.9)        16   ò÷ ó   ó
  Ardebil (75.4)          1   òø ó   ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòø
  Azarbayjan W (74.9)     3   òôò÷   ó                   ó
  Hormozgan (73.8)       11   ò÷     ó                   ó
  Azarbayjan E (82.7)     2   òø     ó                   ó
  Khozestan (83.7)       17   òôòòòòò÷                   ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòø
  Fars (85.8)             6   òú                         ó                  ó   
  Gilan (85.7)            8   òú                         ó                  ó   
  Markazi (84.6)         21   ò÷                         ó                  ó   
  Kohgilooyeh (71.3)     18   òûòòòòòòòø                 ó                  ó   
  Kordestan (68.3)       19   ò÷       ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷                  ó   
  Sistan&Balo.(62.1)     25   òòòòòòòòò÷                                    ó   
  Isfahan (96.1)         13   òø                                            ó 
  Qom (96.2)             23   òú                                            ó  
  Yazd (97.3)            27   òôòòòø                                        ó   
  Tehran (99.4)          26   ò÷   ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷
  Semnan (91.8)          24   òòòòò÷
Figure 5. Dendrogram for between-groups linkage hierarchical cluster analysis of                       
scores of social development Index among provinces; Iran, 1996                                   
Legend for Provinces:
Bold:       Developed 
Underlined: Moderate Developed 
Italic:     Less Developed 
Source: Table 2
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 Figure 6. Scatter plots of social development and fertility
among provinces; Iran,1986 and 1996
Source: Table 2
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